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MS. MULLINS: As a really great follow up to Mr. 
Inglis, our next speaker will go into more detail about what 
you’ve heard regarding the 702 and 215 reports. She is on the 
board of the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board,1 
which are responsible for issuing those reports. This is Ms. 
Elisebeth Collins who was also previously with the 
Department of Justice for fourteen years.2 And in 2008, she 
was unanimously confirmed by the Senate as Assistant 
Attorney General for Legal Policy.3 Please welcome Ms. 
Collins. 
 
MS. COLLINS: So, thank you, guys, so much. 
(Applause) 
                                                 
1 Elisebeth B. Collins, PRIVACY AND CIVIL LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT BOARD, 
https://www.pclob.gov/about-us/board/collins.html (last visited 
July 16, 2015).  The views expressed are of Board Member Collins, 
and do not necessarily represent the Board or U.S. Government. 
2 Id. 
3 Id. 
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I just wanted to begin by thanking the Duncan School 
of Law for hosting this event and inviting me to speak. I can 
say the hospitality here has been delightful and the speakers 
quite provocative. So provocative, in fact, that I have spent 
most of the day completely rewriting my remarks. So, if, or 
really when, I can't read my own handwriting, please forgive 
me. And if I start going grossly over time because I now have 
no idea of how long my remarks are going to be, keep me in 
check, please. If you have a gong, use it.  
So, briefly, as was explained, I am a Board Member of 
the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board.4 This is a new 
independent, Executive Branch agency, which is charged with 
providing advice and oversight with respect to Federal 
counterterrorism programs.5 To be clear, we are an 
independent Executive Branch agency.6 I believe we were 
referred to here as President Obama's Board. We are not. And 
we are also distinct from the President's Review Group, which 
was mentioned previously.7 We are a permanent Federal 
agency constituted by Congress with statutory responsibilities 
and authorities.8  
So, the impact of spilling national secrets is obviously 
an interesting topic, but it is not by any stretch of the 
imagination a new topic. As we've seen throughout our 
nation's history, whether it's because of war, armed conflict, or 
a period of international tension, the public sentiment 
surrounding the open press and the public's right to know 
about its government has swung between periods of civil 
libertarianism and periods in which citizens are apparently 
more willing to potentially sacrifice degrees of their personal 
liberty for the prospect of being secure. And while 
technological advances, the internet, and changes to the 
government's ability to collect and retain information has 
changed the scope of the debate, many basic issues remain 
very much the same. Primary among those issues is what level 
                                                 
4 Id. 
5 PRIVACY AND CIVIL LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT BOARD, 
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of government transparency best serves both the nation's 
security interests and the need of an informed public in a 
representative democracy. So, concern about collateral effects 
from unauthorized disclosures of sensitive government 
information was foremost on the minds of the Founding 
Fathers, particularly in the context of protecting our strategic 
military advantage during the Revolution. For example, the 
Second Continental Congress established secret committees 
that were dedicated to what we are familiar with as modern 
day intelligence activities; counter intelligence operations, 
munitions, and arms acquisitions and foreign intelligence 
collection.9 The Constitution itself recognizes that certain 
matters of government operations and debate are best 
conducted in an environment where there is some degree of 
confidentiality.10  
In looking at the powers of both the Executive Branch 
and the Legislature, the Constitution grants both bodies the 
discretion when to publicly report or when not to publicly 
report. In Article I, this is granted to Congress by requiring 
that Congress keep a journal of proceedings "and from time to 
time, publish the same, excepting such parts as may in their 
judgment require secrecy."11 For the Executive Branch, the lack 
of specificity in the language on the mechanisms, 
circumstances, or frequency with which the President is to 
report to Congress, aside from again saying from time to time, 
was according to the Federalist papers designed to provide the 
President a measure of flexibility for secrecy purposes.12 But at 
the same time, we have throughout history established an 
entire infrastructure of policy, law, and oversight that is 
designed to regulate and manage those government 
operations that are determined to be too sensitive for public 
disclosure. Congress and especially the Executive Branch have 
implemented a number of policies and statutory frameworks 
that are designed to ensure that the need to protect national 
security information is equally balanced with civil liberties 
                                                 
9 Secret Committee of Correspondence, OFFICE OF THE HISTORIAN, 
https://history.state.gov/milestones/1776-1783/secret-committee 
(last visited July 16, 2015). 
10 U.S. CONST. art. I, §5, cl. 3. 
11 U.S. CONST. art. I, §5, cl. 3. 
12 THE FEDERALIST NO. 70 (Alexander Hamilton). 
INDEPENDENT OVERSIGHT                                          146 
 
and the public's right to know.  
For example, Congress has given the Judicial Branch a 
role through mechanisms like the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Act which gives the FISA Court, which is 
comprised of sitting Article III Judges, an active role in 
approving and monitoring the government's intelligence 
collection activities.13 This top secret court, as it was referred to 
earlier, is codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1861, which is a public 
document.14  
Congress also has a direct oversight role, not only 
through the power of the purse, but more directly through the 
Select Committees on Intelligence in both the House and the 
Senate. And internal to the Executive Branch, there are 
oversight offices like the various offices of the Inspector 
General, the President's Intelligence Oversight Board, and the 
Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board. But there can be 
no doubt that pressure for public education and transparency 
must be maintained consistent with national security 
imperatives. My agency, the Privacy and Civil Liberties 
Oversight Board, grapples with this balance every day. That's 
what we do. Increasing public information about 
counterterrorism programs and the oversight of those 
programs is not just a part of our mission statement or our 
strategic goal. We have a statutory mandate to make our 
reports available to the public to the most that we can and to 
hold open hearings that inform the public on our oversight 
and advisory roles.15 To that end, we have had public hearings 
that were televised on C-SPAN or C-SPAN 3, depending on 
how interesting they were presumed to be ahead of time and 
sometimes at two in the morning, but that's all right. They're 
available. We have had public hearings on the 215 and the 702 
Programs. And to date, we have published two extensive 
reports on the counterterrorism programs that we have been 
talking about today; the metadata program under 215 and the 
collection conducted under Section 702 of FISA.16 These 
                                                 
13 50 U.S.C.A. § 1861 (West 2015).  
14 Id. 
15 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000ee (West 2015). 
16 PRIVACY AND CIVIL LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT BOARD, 
https://www.pclob.gov/library.html (last visited July 16, 2015). 
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reports are both available on our public website.17 And if you 
have the spare time to read about three hundred and fifty 
single spaced pages of information, there is a wealth of detail 
about the operation of the Section 215 and 702 Programs.18 
And I will talk more about these reports a bit later in my 
comments. But on the topic of transparency, both of these 
reports contain large amounts of information that was 
declassified for the purpose of this publication.  
For example, in the 702 report, there are over one 
hundred factual details about that program that we were able 
to declassify and to publish.19 Now, apparently, I'm also the 
ethics credit for today. So, I'll say here, this raises serious 
ethical considerations as to what facts to push for 
declassification, asking yourself, are you really in the best 
judge --position to judge whether or not declassification and 
publication of specific facts might eventually do harm to this 
country or our people. But this is what we've looked to every 
single day. This is what we do.  
So, both of the reports also contain numerous 
recommendations for the intelligence community and the 
FISA Court, which we've talked about, that aimed at 
increasing the public's knowledge about these programs and 
the oversight of these programs, whether it would be through 
publication of the significant FISA Court documents, which 
we support, the declassification of previous opinions, which 
we have also supported, the declassification of the 
minimization procedures that Chris [Inglis] had referred to, 
which are the court-ordered rules for how agencies like the 
NSA, CIA, and FBI can handle information that is acquired 
pursuant to these types of programs, and also, by permitting 
service providers to talk in greater detail about their 
compliance with these government production orders.20 In 
each of these recommendations, however, we recognized that 
all of this increased transparency would need to be taken 
                                                 
17 Id. 
18 Id. 
19 David Medine et al., Report on the Surveillance Program Operated 
Pursuant to Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act 
(2014). 
20 PRIVACY AND CIVIL LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT BOARD, 
https://www.pclob.gov/library.html (last visited July 16, 2015). 
INDEPENDENT OVERSIGHT                                          148 
 
consistent with the needs of national security. This balance, 
taken with thoughtful engagement of the intelligence 
community, is designed to maximize the flow of information 
to the public, which does include our enemies, while 
minimizing the dangers inherent in unauthorized disclosures.  
Turning to those unauthorized disclosures very briefly, 
it is for others to judge the merit and the value of them, but I 
think it's fair to say the way I approach it is that we will not 
know today or tomorrow the damage that is done either by 
unauthorized disclosures or by deliberate approved 
disclosure, such as that is contained in our reports. This is 
something that we'll see only over time. I think there are 
indications that there have been significant repercussions from 
the unauthorized disclosures.  
Last month, the Telegraph newspaper published an 
article about how GCHQ, which is Britain's equivalent of the 
NSA, is now blind to more than a quarter of the activities of 
the U.K.'s more serious criminals because they have changed 
their communication methods as a result of Edward 
Snowden.21 Again, it can be applauded, there could be merit to 
these disclosures, but we also have to be cognizant of the 
consequences of these disclosures. And an article about one 
specifically particularly caught my eye. It said, "There had 
never been anything like it. It was as if an NSA employee had 
publicly revealed the complete communications intelligence 
operations of the agency for the past twelve years, all its 
techniques and major successes, its organizational structure 
and budget, and had, for good measure, included actual 
intercepts, secrets, and transitions of our communications not 
only for our adversaries, but of our allies, as well."22 But this is 
actually a quote from a 1981 article in an NSA publication 
called "A Cryptologic Spectrum.”23 More surprisingly, the 
article is about a tell-all book you've actually heard reference 
                                                 
21 Tom Whitehead, GCHQ warns serious criminals have been lost in wake 




22 National Security Agency, The Many Lives of Herbert O. Yardley, 
CRYPTOLOGIC SPECTRUM, Autumn 1981 at 10. 
23 Id. 
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to earlier today that was published in 1931 by one of U.S. 
Government's most prolific code breakers, Mr. Herbert O. 
Yardley.24 In the book, called the "American Black Chamber", 
Yardley disclosed scores of details about our ability to break 
foreign communication codes, including the notorious 
Japanese "Purple Code."25 Academics have argued that these 
disclosures caused our enemies to adopt more complex 
encryption standards to better secure their methods of 
communication. This, in turn, they suggest is related to the 
intelligence failures that led to the attack on Pearl Harbor. So, 
we will have to wait and see about the impacts of these 
unauthorized disclosures and of our authorized disclosures in 
our reports over time. They may be merited, but they will 
have consequences.  
Let me turn just a little bit more to the Board itself and 
the reports that we have issued, which again are available for 
a quick, light read at night from our website.26 So, the 9/11 
Commission Report recognized that changes to U.S. counter-
terrorism programs would require greater coordination and 
collection capabilities for the U.S. intelligence and law 
enforcement agencies.27 But to balance this need, the 
Commission recommended that the Executive Branch 
establish a Board whose responsibility it was to balance the 
security needs of the government with the privacy interests of 
American citizens.28 In following this recommendation, 
President Bush created the first incarnation of the Board by 
Executive Order in 2004. At that time, the Board was chaired 
by a Deputy Attorney General --the Deputy Attorney General 
and consisted of twenty-two additional members from across 
the Federal Government. That Board met six times. And I 
think it's safe to say it did not, it did not advance the cause of 
privacy or civil liberties in any sort of meaningful way.  
Congress then reacted to this Executive Branch attempt 
by implementing a statutory version of the Board, but housed 
it once again in the Executive Office of the President. So, 
                                                 
24 Herbert O. Yardley, The American Black Chamber (1931). 
25 Id. 
26 PRIVACY AND CIVIL LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT BOARD, 
https://www.pclob.gov/library.html (last visited July 16, 2015). 
27 Thomas H. Kean et al., The 9/11 Commission Report (2004). 
28 Id. 
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within the direct purview of the President. Only the Chair and 
the Vice Chair of the Board were subject to Senate approval. 
This version folded under a perception that it was 
insufficiently independent. So, in 2007, the Board underwent 
its most recent legislative reorganization with the passage of 
the implementing of the recommendations of the 9/11 
Commission Act.29 The Board is now comprised of five 
members, of which I am one, all serving upon nomination of 
the President with the advice and consent of the Senate.30 And 
we serve staggered six-year terms.31 Four of the members, 
including myself, are part time. We are barred by statute from 
working more than one hundred and twenty-nine days out of 
the year on Board work.32 Our Chairman is full time. And we 
are fully independent, which made it extremely difficult to get 
up and running the first couple of years, but I think in terms of 
both substance and optics is the correct formulation for the 
Board and the correct organization. So, in 2014, and pursuant 
to requests from both the White House and members of 
Congress, the Board undertook two deep dives, one into 
Section 215 and one into the 702 Program.33  
So, turning to the Section 215 program, which I had no 
idea of how much education I was going to do by this point in 
the afternoon, I will cut to the chase. Section 215 was designed 
to be the national security equivalent of a subpoena, which is 
                                                 
29 Id. 
30 PRIVACY AND CIVIL LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT BOARD, 
https://www.pclob.gov/about-us.html (last visited July 16, 2015). 
31 Id. 
32 The four non-Chairman Board Members are currently designated 
as Special Government Employees (“SGEs”), 18 U.S.C. § 202(a), 
which means they do not plan to work more than 130 days in a 365-
day period. Office of Government Ethics Memorandum 00x1, at 5 
(Feb. 15, 2000), available at 
https://www2.oge.gov/Web/OGE.nsf/All+Advisories/DDABAE3
4F0273E5F85257E96005FBDDE/$FILE/00x1.pdf?open. If Members 
work more than 130 days during that period, they are still 
considered SGEs, but should consider whether to be re-designated 
for the next 365-day period. Id. 
33 PRIVACY AND CIVIL LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT BOARD, 
https://www.pclob.gov/library.html (last visited July 16, 2015). 
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available in grand jury proceedings.34 And pursuant to that 
authority, the FISA Court issued an Order that directed certain 
telephone companies to produce certain call detail records to 
the NSA; specifically, as we've heard, the calling and receiving 
numbers and the time and length of the call, but not subscriber 
information. The FISA Court's Order resulted in the 
production of call detail records in bulk, huge amounts of 
bulk, leading to a fast government repository of this type of 
information. The Board fundamentally split in our assessment 
of the program with the majority concluding that it was 
unlawful and ineffective and that it raised significant 
Constitutional concerns.  
In my separate, dissenting statement to the 215 report, 
which I commend to you is a pithy five pages, a very easy read 
if you have the time, I agreed with the majority of the Board's 
recommendations, but departed from the Board in three 
important areas. First, while the majority of the members felt 
that the collection of bulk telephone data did not have an 
adequate statutory basis, my view of the program was that it 
fit within a permissible interpretation of the statute. At the 
time, no fewer than a dozen Federal Judges had reached the 
same conclusion. Second, I did not agree with majority's 
Constitutional analysis, which I viewed as aspirational rather 
than actual. The majority concluded that the program raised 
concerns under both the First and Fourth Amendments. On 
the Fourth Amendment question, I believe, as did the FISA 
Court in approving the government's applications, that the 
government was entitled to rely on the Supreme Court's case 
law regarding metadata, such as digit styled and the third-
party records doctrine. It is certainly true that Fourth 
Amendment law may dramatically shift. Justice Sotomayor 
and Justice Alito each have indicated a willingness to re-
examine fundamental Fourth Amendment concepts, but it has 
not happened yet. Similarly, with regard to the First 
Amendment, I believed that the majority was analyzing a 
program that did not actually exist, and in doing so, had a 
concern about the chilling effect of the program that I thought 
was divorced from the reality of the program, which, as we've 
                                                 
34 David Medine et al., Report on the Telephone Records Program 
Conducted under Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act and on the 
Operations of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (2014). 
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heard, was actually a highly programmed --cabin program. In 
the actual programs, the odds were something along the lines 
of .00001 percent that your number would ever be associated 
in any way with your subscriber information. And, again, it is 
true that the Court may take into consideration the ability to --
We connect the dots not just about our enemies, but also we 
have the potential to connect the dots about our own citizens. 
And the Court may eventually have that as a First 
Amendment matter. But they are not there yet. So, I thought it 
was unfair of the majority to analyze a program that didn't 
exist under case law that is not where the majority thought it 
was. I also did not join with the majority of the Board as to 
their conclusion as to the efficacy and utility of the bulk 
program. In today's world of multiple threats, complex 
methods of communication, and technological advancement, a 
tool that helps investigators to prioritize information and to 
triage information and to focus on those who are more likely 
to be doing harm to or in the United States, I think it's both 
good government and potentially more protective of privacy. 
The only question about efficacy of government programs 
should not be how many plots has this particular tool 
thwarted --Although I fault the government, as well, because 
the first thing that the government does every time to defend a 
program is to say, well, we've thwarted x, y, z. And those 
numbers typically change over time as we start to unpeel 
them. That's how many plots this specific tool has thwarted. I 
think we need to take a more holistic view of how we assess 
the efficacy of counterterrorism programs. And that's one of 
the major recommendations that the Board has unanimously 
made to the intelligence community, to the Administration.  
For policy reasons, not for legal or Constitutional 
reasons, I did sign on to ten recommendations, including 
limitations on the interim operation of the program. I also 
agreed that the public trust could benefit from changes to the 
operation of the FISA Court. Our recommendations included 
the establishment of a special advocate to bring some 
adversariality to the operations of the FISA Court and, as I had 
mentioned earlier, an emphasis on drafting opinions so that 
they could be declassified at least in part, and an effort to go 
back and start declassifying important opinions of the Court.35  
                                                 
35 Id. 
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So, the second report, which I will turn to briefly, was 
on the 702 Report. In this report, we again examined an 
intelligence program that was a major product of the Snowden 
disclosures.36 This time, however, the Board found that the 
program conducted under Section 702 operated under sound 
Constitutional and statutory authority, and that it contained 
protections and procedures that were reasonably designed to 
protect against the unauthorized use of personal information.37 
Further, the Board recognized the considerable intelligence 
value that this method of collection provided the 
government.38 This is as to the core of the program. That said 
there are serious Fourth Amendment implications to the 
Section 702 Program. And although the government does not 
take the position that there are no Fourth Amendment 
implications, I'm not sure where that has come into, into the 
ether or why that was stated earlier today. Instead, what they 
stated is there's not a specific warrant requirement, but that 
the Section 702 Program does meet the reasonableness prong 
of the Fourth Amendment. And it needs to meet that because 
of the amount of incidental collection of American citizens' 
communications. And here I'm talking about what's been 
discussed earlier, which is where you target a non-U.S. person 
overseas, but they're calling to the United States. This is called 
incidental collection. And it was a major focus of the Board's 
work, the Board's concern about the potential Fourth 
Amendment implications.  
And to that end, a number of our key 
recommendations are for the NSA to take a serious look at 
what is the scope of this incidental collection.39 To date, the 
NSA had refused requests, primarily based on feasibility 
grounds, by members of Congress, such as Wyden, to look at 
the issue of, well, how much is being collected that is actually 
U.S. person communication. I am proud to say that after 
approximately six weeks of negotiation, the NSA is moving 
forward on four different types of reports. They are doing an 
                                                 
36 David Medine et al., Report on the Surveillance Program Operated 
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assessment to try and figure out how much of this personal 
information is in there because, of course, that informs both 
the Fourth Amendment analysis and the policy consideration. 
So, we were unanimous in our 702 Report. And I think both of 
those demonstrate just a few things that I would like to leave 
you with because I know that I'm perilously close to running 
late. You know, there are a couple of issues at the margins of 
the 702 Program that I think are difficult legal questions that 
the Court has thus far, other than the FISA Court, declined to 
weigh into. One of them is the incidental communications. The 
other is something that was raised earlier today. And that is, 
how do they use this information? So, for example, should 
information collected pursuant to Section 702, which has a 
lower threshold than probable cause, an individualized 
determination, should that be available to or used in criminal 
investigations?  
And I'll pose an ethics problem for you, which is, 
should it be required to be made available to criminal 
investigations because there may be exculpatory information 
in the 702 collected communications and metadata? I look 
forward to questions from you all. I think this has been a 
fantastic event. I hope that I have left you with at least a small 
interest in going to www.pclob.gov. I'm serious. Our mission 
is to educate you and inform you about what the government 
is doing on your behalf. So, thank you. (Applause)  
 
(End of excerpt of Symposium.)  
 
